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ABSTRACT
A disproportionate share of low-skilled U.S. workers is employed by temporary-help firms. These
firms offer rapid entry into paid employment, but temporary-help jobs are typically brief, and it is
unknown whether they foster longer-term employment. We exploit a unique aspect of the city of Detroit’s
welfare-to-work program, in which one in five jobs taken is obtained with a temporary-help firm, to
identify the effects of temporary-help jobs on the subsequent labor market advancement of low-skilled
workers. Welfare participants are assigned on a rotating basis to one of numerous program providers
that have substantially different placement rates into temporary-help and regular (‘direct-hire’) jobs
but offer otherwise standardized services. This gives rise to variation in job-taking rates that is functionally
equivalent to random assignment. Using provider assignments as instrumental variables, we find that
temporary-help job placements yield significant short-term earnings gains, but these gains are offset
by lower earnings and less frequent employment over the next one to two years. Job placements with
direct-hire employers, by contrast, substantially raise earnings over one, two, and three years following
placement. The primary observable difference between these types of job placements is their effect
on subsequent employment stability. Direct-hire placements roughly double the probability of ongoing
employment in each of the first eight quarters following program assignment, while temporary help
placements only positively affect the probability of ongoing employment for two quarters and do not
facilitate transitions to direct-hire jobs. These results qualify the interpretation of a large experimental
literature documenting the benefits of job placement services for labor market outcomes of low-skilled
workers. We find that the benefits of job placements derive entirely from direct-hire jobs; placing












houseman@upjohninstitute.orgA disproportionate share of low-skilled and minority U.S. workers is employed by temporary-help
ﬁrms.1 Within the low-skill population, employment in temporary help is especially prevalent among
participants in public employment and training programs. Although the temporary-help industry
accounts for less than 3 percent of average daily employment in the United States, state administra-
tive data show that 15 to 40 percent of former welfare recipients who obtained employment in the
years following the 1996 U.S. welfare reform took jobs in the temporary-help sector.2 Comparing
the industry distribution of employment of participants in Missouri welfare, job training, and labor
exchange programs before and immediately following program participation, Heinrich, Mueser, and
Troske (2007) ﬁnd that participation in government programs is associated with a 50 to 100 percent
increase in employment in temporary-help ﬁrms and that no other industry displays such a spike in
employment.
The concentration of low-skilled workers in the temporary-help sector and the high employment
rates of participants in government employment programs in temporary-help jobs have catalyzed
a debate as to whether temporary-help jobs facilitate or hinder labor market advancement. Lack
of employment stability is the principal obstacle to economic self-suﬃciency among the low-skilled
population, and thus a main goal of welfare-to-work and other employment programs targeting low-
skilled workers is to help participants ﬁnd stable employment (Bloom et al. 2005). Temporary-help
jobs are typically less stable than regular (‘direct-hire’) jobs.3 Nevertheless, it is plausible that, by
providing an opportunity to develop contacts with potential employers and acquire other types of
human capital, temporary-help jobs allow workers to transition to more stable employment than
they otherwise would have attained. Moreover, because temporary-help ﬁrms face relatively low
screening and termination costs, numerous researchers have posited that they may hire individuals
who otherwise would have diﬃculty ﬁnding any employment, and that this may lead directly or
indirectly to employment in direct-hire positions (Abraham 1988; Katz and Krueger 1999; Autor 2001
and 2003; Houseman 2001; Autor and Houseman 2002b; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003;
Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden 2003).
1In 2005, high school dropouts comprised 17 percent of workers in temporary-help employment and only 9 percent of
workers in direct-hire employment. The comparable percentages for African Americans were 23 percent and 11 percent.
In contrast, those with college degrees made up only 21 percent of temporary-help workers and about 33 percent of
workers in direct-hire employment (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005).
2See Autor and Houseman (2002b) on Georgia and Washington state; Cancian et al. (1999) on Wisconsin; Heinrich,
Mueser, and Troske (2005) on North Carolina and Missouri; and Pawasarat (1997) on Wisconsin. Heinrich, Mueser and
Troske (2007) estimate that participation in welfare-to-work, job training, and employment services in Missouri increases
the likelihood that workers take temporary-help positions by 50 to 100 percent.
3In a six-city study of welfare recipients that controls for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, King and Mueser (2005) ﬁnd that,
among all industries, the temporary help sector provides the shortest expected employment durations and the lowest
quarterly earnings.
1Oﬀering a contrasting hypothesis, a set of scholars and practitioners have argued that the unstable
and primarily low-skilled jobs oﬀered by temporary-help ﬁrms provide little opportunity for workers
to invest in human capital or engage in productive job search (Parker 1994; Pawasarat 1997; Jor-
genson and Riemer 2000; Benner, Leete and Pastor, 2007). This hypothesis, however, only implies
that temporary-help jobs inhibit labor market advancement if these jobs displace more productive
employment activities. Thus, a central question for evaluation is whether temporary-help positions
crowd out other job search and human capital acquisition activities.
Distinguishing among these competing hypotheses poses an empirical challenge. It is inherently
diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of holding given job types from the skills and motivations that
cause workers to hold these jobs initially. This issue is not amenable to study with a traditional
randomized experimental design since it is infeasible to coerce workers to obtain diﬀerent types of
jobs. The inference problem is particularly acute in the setting we study because low-skill workers
in general–and welfare clients in particular–cycle regularly through states of employment and non-
employment. For example, the modal worker in our sample of low-skilled workers from Detroit works
only two of every four quarters, and workers found in either temporary-help or direct-hire jobs at
a point in time are clearly positively self-selected relative to welfare recipients who are not working.
Absent a source of variation that causally aﬀects the probability that workers obtain temporary-help or
direct-hire employment but is otherwise uncorrelated with workers’ skills and motivations, statistical
comparisons of workers by job type appear likely to yield biased estimates of the causal eﬀects of
job-holding.
This study exploits a unique aspect of the city of Detroit’s welfare-to-work program (Work First)
to identify the causal eﬀects of temporary-help and direct-hire jobs on the subsequent labor market
advancement of low-skilled workers. Welfare participants in Detroit are assigned on a rotating basis
to one of numerous not-for-proﬁt program providers–termed contractors–that have substantially
diﬀerent placement rates into temporary-help and direct-hire jobs but oﬀer otherwise standardized
services. As we demonstrate below, this rotational assignment is functionally equivalent to random
assignment of participants to Work First contractors, leading to a setting where contractor assign-
ments are uncorrelated with participant characteristics but are correlated with the probability that
participants are placed into a direct-hire job, a temporary-help job, or no job during their Work First
spells. These program features enable us to use contractor assignments as instrumental variables for
job-taking. This identiﬁcation strategy is analogous to that in Kling (2005) and Doyle (2007), both
2of whom use administrative assignment mechanisms as instrumental variables to identify plausibly
exogenous variation in ‘treatments’ that are otherwise diﬃcult to randomly assign–prison sentences
in the case of Kling and foster care assignment in the case of Doyle. Distinct from these studies, we
analyze the causal eﬀects of two endogenous variables simultaneously: temporary-help and direct-hire
employment. Our econometric framework lays out the conditions necessary for valid causal inference
in this multiple endogenous variable setting.
Our analysis draws on administrative records from the Detroit Work First program linked with
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records for the entire State of Michigan for over 37,000 Work First
spells commencing between 1999 and 2003.4 The administrative data provide person-level demographic
information on Work First participants and the jobs they obtain during their Work First spells. The
UI wage records track participants’ quarterly earnings in each job held for two years before entering
the program and for two to three years following program participation. Consistent with welfare
populations studied in Georgia, Washington, North Carolina, Missouri, and Wisconsin, the incidence
of temporary-help employment is in Detroit is high; one in ﬁve jobs obtained during Work First
contractor assignments is obtained with a temporary-help ﬁrm. This provides ample variation to
simultaneously analyze the causal eﬀects of direct-hire and temporary-help jobs on subsequent labor
market outcomes.
The analysis yields two main results. Direct-hire placements induced by contractor assignments
raise Work First participants’ payroll earnings by two to three thousand dollars per year–approximately
a 40 percent increase over baseline for this low-skill population–and increase time employed by one to
two quarters in each of the subsequent three years calendar years. These eﬀects are highly statistically
signiﬁcant and are economically large. Temporary-help placements, by contrast, only signiﬁcantly
r a i s ee m p l o y m e n ta n de a r n i n g si nt h eﬁrst quarter following contractor assignment. These beneﬁts
wash out within a year, and the estimated eﬀects of temporary-help placements on employment and
earnings become slightly negative thereafter. The precision of these estimates rules out even mod-
erately positive eﬀects of temporary-help job placements. The 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the
estimates excludes cumulative earnings gains over two calendar years larger than $800 and employment
gains greater than one-half a calendar quarter.
Complementary analyses provide insights into why direct-hire placements improve long-term labor
market outcomes while temporary-help placements fail to do so. The primary observable diﬀerence in
4We are particularly grateful to Cylenthia Miller and Deborah Watson for providing access to these data.
3the eﬀects of these job types is their eﬀect on job stability. Placements into direct-hire jobs increase the
subsequent probability of having one employer per quarter, raise tenure and earnings in the longest-
held job, and approximately double the probability of ongoing employment in the subsequent eight
quarters. Placements into temporary-help jobs do not foster transitions to direct-hire jobs and, in
the ﬁrst year following contractor assignment, only increase earnings in the temporary help sector
while crowding out earnings in direct-hire jobs by approximately oﬀsetting amounts. Consistent with
this ﬁnding, temporary-help placements increase the probability of having multiple employers or no
employer in a calendar quarter, reduce tenure and earnings in the longest-held job, and have no eﬀect
on the probability of on-going employment after two quarters. In net, relative to no job placement,
temporary-help placements have no beneﬁcial or detrimental eﬀect on earnings, employment, or labor
market advancement of low-skilled workers over any signiﬁcant time-span.
We emphasize that our results pertain to the marginal temporary-help job placements induced by
the randomization of Work First clients across contractors, and therefore do not preclude the possibility
that infra-marginal temporary-help placements generate signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Using methods proposed
by Abadie (2002), we estimate the characteristics of marginal workers–those whose job placements are
causally aﬀected by program assignments–and compare them to the full set of job takers in the Work
First population. Logically, marginal workers have somewhat weaker prior earnings histories than do
average job takers–though the diﬀerences are surprisingly small and are insigniﬁcant at conventional
levels. We further estimate that marginal direct-hire and marginal temporary-help workers have
comparable prior earnings and employment histories, implying that the causal eﬀects estimates for
these job types are identiﬁed by comparable treatment populations. In conjunction with our main
results, this suggests that had marginal workers been placed in direct-hire rather than temporary-help
jobs, they would likely have fared better.
We provide a variety of tests of the robustness and plausibility of these results. We demonstrate
that our ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the instrumental variables and conﬁrm that
our results do not suﬀer from weak instruments biases. We also carefully evaluate a potential threat
to validity of the analytic framework. The use of contractor assignments as instrumental variables for
job placement types requires that either contractors only aﬀect participant outcomes through their
inﬂuence on the types of jobs that they take or, alternatively, that any other eﬀects that contractors
may have on participant outcomes is orthogonal to the eﬀect operating through job placement. We
argue that, by design, there is little scope for contractors to substantially aﬀect participant outcomes
4through any modality other than job placements. Consistent with this contention, we demonstrate
that the eﬀect of contractor assignments on participant outcomes is fully captured by contractors’
placement rates into temporary-help and direct-hire jobs.
Our ﬁndings are pertinent to the economics literature on active labor market programs designed
to improve employment and earnings among low-skilled workers. Large-scale random assignment
experiments conducted with welfare-to-work and adult disadvantaged populations in the 1990s found
that, compared to more costly intervention strategies, job placement services were as or more eﬀective
at improving subsequent labor market outcomes (see Bloom et al. and Bloom and Michalopoulos
2001 for summaries). This experimental evidence provided a research basis for the “Work First”
approach to welfare-to-work programs used in Michigan and most other states. Consistent with this
experimental literature, we estimate that job placements signiﬁcantly improve aﬀected workers’ long-
term employment and earnings outcome. However, we also ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of job placement
services derive entirely from placements into direct-hire jobs, thus placing an important qualiﬁcation
on the conventional wisdom that placement into any job is better than no job.
Most closely related to the present analysis are a handful of recent U.S. studies that estimate the ef-
fects of temporary-help employment on subsequent labor market outcomes of low-skill and low-income
populations, and a parallel European literature that evaluates whether temporary-help employment,
as well as ﬁxed-term contracts, provide a stepping stone into stable employment.5 To account for
the likely non-random selection of workers with diﬀerent earnings capacities and motivations to work
into diﬀerent job types, these studies use a variety of statistical control approaches including include
regression control, matching, ﬁxed-eﬀects, selection-adjustment, and structural estimation techniques.
With the exception of Benner, Leete and Pastor (2007), these U.S. and European studies uniformly
conclude that temporary-help jobs beneﬁt workers, either by facilitating longer-term labor market
attachment or, at a minimum, by substituting for spells of unemployment.6
Our study diﬀers from this work in two key respects. First, our research design exploits a source of
plausibly exogenous variation in temporary-help and direct-hire job-taking, stemming from adminis-
5U.S. studies include Ferber and Waldfogel (1998), Lane et al. (2003), Corcoran and Chen (2004), Andersson, Holzer
and Lane (2005, 2007), Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005, 2007), and Benner, Leete and Pastor (2007). Studies on
temporary help and ﬁxed-term contract employment in Europe include Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002), García-
Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2002), Andersson and Wadensjö (2004), Zijl, van den Berg, and Hemya (2004), Ichino, Mealli
and Nannicini (2005, forthcoming), Gerﬁn, Lechner and Steiger (2005), Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz-Bullón
(2005), Böheim and Cardoso (2007), Kvasnicka (2007).
6Given the diversity of labor market institutions in European economies, there is no presumption that the cross-
country ﬁndings should be comparable. This makes it all the more striking that studies in this literature have developed
such consistent results.
5trative assignments. Second, our analysis ﬁnds that temporary-help jobs do not improve labor-market
outcomes of low-skilled workers. To assess why our results diﬀer from the literature, we estimate
detailed OLS models, akin to those found in earlier studies, of the relationship between temporary-
help employment and subsequent labor market outcomes. These estimates are closely comparable to
those in the literature, suggesting that the discrepancy between our ﬁndings and prior work is due
to substantive diﬀerences in methodology rather than discrepancies in sample frame. We suggest two
potential reconciliations for these disparate ﬁndings. There may be substantial diﬀerences between
the marginal treatment eﬀects of temporary-help placements recovered by our instrumental variables
estimates and the average treatment eﬀects recovered by other estimators. Alternatively, the statisti-
cal techniques used in the literature may be unable to fully diﬀerentiate the causal eﬀects of holding
given job types from the unmeasured skills and motivations that cause self-selection into these jobs.
1 Context: Work First Contractor Assignments in Detroit
Our study exploits the unique structure of Detroit’s welfare-to-work program to identify the long-term
consequences of temporary-help and direct-hire employment on labor market outcomes of low-skilled
workers. Most recipients of TANF beneﬁts (‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families’) must fulﬁll
mandatory minimum work requirements. TANF applicants in Detroit who do not already meet these
work requirements are assigned to Work First programs, which serve to place them in employment.
For administrative purposes, Detroit’s welfare and Work First programs are divided into fourteen
geographic districts. TANF participants are assigned to districts according to zip code of residence.
The City of Detroit administers the Work First program, but the provision of services is contracted
out to non-proﬁt or public organizations. One to three Work First contractors service each district,
and when multiple contractors provide Work First services within a district, the City’s Work First
oﬃce rotates the assignment of participants to contractors on a weekly basis. The contractor to which
a participant is assigned thus depends on the date that he or she applies for TANF.
Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram of Detroit’s Work First program and the rotational assign-
ment of participants to contractors. Upon entry, participants, who vary in terms of their personal
characteristics and work histories, are assigned to a contractor operating in their district.7 All con-
tractors operating in Detroit oﬀer a fairly standardized one-week orientation. Following orientation,
participants must search intensively for a job. Few resources are spent on anything but job devel-
7Participants reentering the system for additional Work First spells follow the same assignment procedure and thus
may be reassigned to another contractor.
6opment, and the general or life skills training provided in the ﬁrst week of the Work First program
is very similar across contractors. Support services intended to aid job retention, such as childcare
and transportation, are equally available to participants in all contractors and are provided outside
the program (Autor and Houseman 2005). Contractors play an integral role in helping to place par-
ticipants into jobs, but systematically vary in their propensities to place participants into direct-hire,
temporary-help, or, indeed any job at all.
It is logical to ask why contractors’ placement practices vary. The most plausible answer is that
contractors are uncertain about which types of job placements are most eﬀective and hence pursue
diﬀerent policies. Contractors do not have access to UI wage records data (used in this study to
assess participants’ labor market outcomes), and they collect follow-up data only for a short time
period and only for individuals placed in jobs. Hence, they cannot rigorously assess whether job
placements improve participant outcomes or whether speciﬁc job placement types matter. During in-
person and phone interviews conducted for this study, contractors expressed considerable uncertainty,
and diﬀering opinions, about the long-term consequences of temporary job placements (Autor and
Houseman 2005).
2 Econometric Framework
This section outlines a simple econometric framework that highlights the conditions under which the
use of rotational assignment of participants to contractors can generate valid causal eﬀects estimates
for the treatments of interest–temporary-help and direct-hire job placements.





sponding to subsequent (i.e., post Work First) outcomes for participants receiving no job placement,
a temporary-help agency job placement, or a direct-hire job placement, respectively, during their
Work First spell. We deﬁne the causal eﬀect of a temporary-help agency placement as Y1 − Y0 and
the causal eﬀect of a direct-hire placement as Y2 − Y0.8 For each participant, we only observe one
outcome, Yi = Y(i)0D(i)0 + Y(i)1D(i)1 + Y(i)2D(i)2),w h e r eD(i)0,D (i)1,D (i)2 are binary variables indi-
cating whether a participant received no placement, a temporary-help placement, or a direct-hire job
placement, respectively, during her Work First spell.
Let Z0,Z 1,Z 2 be a set of binary instruments, representing contractor assignments. These Z0sa r e
independent of potential outcomes Y0,Y 1,Y 2 but that are correlated with D0,D 1,D 2 in the population.
8T h ec h o i c eo fY0 as the comparison state is innocuous since the three potential outcomes yield exactly two unique
contrasts.
7We deﬁne a set of indicator variables that reﬂects the potential job placements that participants would
obtain if assigned to each contractor. Let Ddz = Dd|Zz =1 . Thus, for example, a participant for whom
D(i)20 =1and D(i)11 =1would obtain a direct-hire job placement if assigned to contractor 0 and
a temporary-help placement if assigned to contractor 1. Note that one potential placement outcome
occurs for each participant at each value of the instrument. So,
P3
d=1 Ddz =1for Z ∈ {1, 2, 3}.W e
make the following identifying assumption:
Assumption 1 Independence of the instrument: The random vector (Y(i)0,Y (i)1,Y (i)2,D (i)0z,D (i)1z,D (i)2z)
is independent of the instruments Z0,Z 1 and Z2.
We anticipate that this assumption will be satisﬁed due to the rotational assignment of participants
to contractors. In section 3, we test and aﬃrm one observable implication of this assumption, which is
that pre-determined participant covariates, such as age, race, gender and prior earnings and quarters of
employment in direct-hire and temporary-help employment, are balanced among participants assigned
to contractors within each district.
We can characterize the expected outcomes of participants randomly assigned to each contractor
as:
E [Y |Z =0]=E [Y0 (1 − D10 − D20)] + E [Y1D10]+E [Y2D20],
E [Y0]+E [(Y1 − Y0)D10]+E [(Y2 − Y0)D20],
E [Y |Z =1]=E [Y0]+E [(Y1 − Y0)D11]+E [(Y2 − Y0)D21],
E [Y |Z =2]=E [Y0]+E [(Y1 − Y0)D12]+E [(Y2 − Y0)D22].
Contrasting the outcomes of participants randomly assigned to contractors 1 and 2 relative to con-
tractor 0 yields:
E [Y |Z =1]− E [Y |Z =0]=E [(Y1 − Y0)(D11 − D10)] + E [(Y2 − Y0)(D21 − D20)], (1)
E [Y |Z =2]− E [Y |Z =0]=E [(Y1 − Y0)(D12 − D10)] + E [(Y2 − Y0)(D22 − D20)]. (2)
Equations (1) and (2) highlight a central feature of the econometric identiﬁcation that arises from
our institutional setting. The contrast among outcomes of participants randomly assigned to any two
contractors combines two sources of variation: a contrast of the outcomes of participants induced
by program assignment to obtain a temporary-help placement instead of no job placement or vice
versa (e.g., D(i)11 >D (i)10 or D(i)11 <D (i)10 in equation (1), and D(i)12 >D (i)10 or D(i)12 <D (i)10
in equation (2)) and a contrast of the outcomes of participants induced by program assignment to
obtain a direct-hire placement instead of no job placement or vice versa (e.g., D(i)21 >D (i)20 or
8D(i)21 <D (i)20 in equation (1), and D(i)22 >D (i)20 or D(i)22 <D (i)20 in equation (2)).9 We denote
these four contrasts–two each arising from the contrast between a pair of contractors–as:
δ11 = E [Y1 − Y0 |D11 6= D10],δ 21 = E [Y2 − Y0 |D21 6= D20],
δ12 = E [Y1 − Y0 |D12 6= D10],δ 22 = E [Y2 − Y0 |D22 6= D20].
Since we have two equations with four unknowns, it is not possible to obtain causal eﬀects estimates of
temporary-help and direct-hire placements without further identifying assumptions. We now consider
two alternative sets of assumptions that permit identiﬁcation.10
2.1 Case 1: Locally constant treatment effects
Consider the following ‘locally constant’ treatment eﬀects assumptions:
Assumption 2 Locally constant eﬀect of temporary-help employment: Y(i)1 −Y(i)0 is constant for all
participants whose placement outcome is changed from no placement to temporary-help or vice versa
by random assignment to either program 1 or program 2.
Assumption 3 Locally constant eﬀect of direct-hire employment: Y(i)2 − Y(i)0 is constant for all
participants whose placement outcome is changed from no placement to direct-hire or vice versa by
random assignment to either program 1 or program 2.
Assumptions (2) and (3) imply that δ11 = δ12 and δ21 = δ22: the causal eﬀect of a temporary-help
placement is constant for the subpopulation whose temporary-help placement outcome is causally
aﬀected by assignment to any program, and similarly for direct-hire placements.
Under these assumptions, we can obtain causal eﬀects estimates of the treatments of interests by
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¸
,
where δ1 = δ11 and δ2 = δ22.T h u s ,δ1 and δ2 can be estimated using standard 2SLS techniques.
9Note that the contrast between those induced to take direct-hire instead of temporary-help placements (or vice versa)
is implicit in equation (1). Consider, for example, a participant for whom D20 =1and D11 =1 . This participant would
take a direct-hire position if assigned to contractor 0 and a temporary-help position if assigned to contractor 1. For this
participant, equation (1) reduces to: E[Y |Z =1 ]− E[Y |Z =0 ]=( Y1 − Y0) − (Y2 − Y0)=Y1 − Y2.
10Although we have two causal eﬀects estimates for each job type, these estimates do not necessarily identify the same
parameter since the set of participants whose job placements are causally aﬀected by program assignments may diﬀer
between programs 1 and 2.
9We refer to this case as a ‘locally constant treatment eﬀects’ because it requires only that treatment
eﬀects are constant for the subpopulation of participants whose employment outcomes are causally
eﬀected by random assignments. This is less restrictive than the conventional assumption that causal
eﬀects are constant in the full treatment population.
2.2 Case 2: Local average treatment effects with independent instruments
An alternative set of assumptions, based on the Local Average Treatment Eﬀects (LATE) framework
of Imbens and Angrist (1996), also is potentially applicable in our setting.
Discarding assumptions (2) and (3), consider the following alternative assumptions:
Assumption 4 No eﬀect of Z1 on D2 (direct-hire job placements): D21 = D20.
Assumption 5 No eﬀect of Z2 on D1 (temporary-help job placements): D12 = D10.
Assumption 6 Monotonicity of response to each instrument: Pr(D11 ≥ D10)=1and Pr(D22 ≥ D20)=
1.
These assumptions imply that we can estimate treatment eﬀects for temporary-help placements
by contrasting outcomes between contractors 1 and 0 and estimate treatment eﬀects for direct-hire
placements from the contrast between contractors 2 and 0. Applying monotonicity, we can rewrite
equations (1) and (2) as:
E [Y |Z =1]− E [Y |Z =0]=E [Y1 − Y0 |D11 >D 10] · Pr(D11 >D 10)
+E [Y2 − Y0 |D21 >D 20] · Pr(D21 >D 20),
and
E [Y |Z =2]− E [Y |Z =0]=E [Y1 − Y0 |D12 >D 10] · Pr(D12 >D 10)
+E [Y2 − Y0 |D22 >D 20] · Pr(D22 >D 20).
Using assumptions (4) and (5), these equations simplify further to:
E [Y |Z =1]− E [Y |Z =0]=E [Y1 − Y0 |D11 >D 10] · Pr(D11 >D 10) (3)
and
E [Y |Z =2]− E [Y |Z =0]= E [Y2 − Y0 |D22 >D 20] · Pr(D22 >D 20). (4)
Thus, causal eﬀects estimates of temporary-help and direct-hire placements can be obtained by esti-
mating separate Instrumental Variables (2SLS) models of equations (3) and (4) using only instruments
10Z1,Z 0 for equation (3) and Z2,Z 0 for equation (4). In particular,
ˆ δ1 =( E [Y |Z =1]− E [Y |Z =0] )/(E [D1 |Z =1]− E [D0 =1|Z =0] ),
ˆ δ2 =( E [Y |Z =2]− E [Y |Z =0] )/(E [D2 |Z =2]− E [D0 =1|Z =0] ).
Since these are eﬀectively independent LATE estimates obtained using the population, control vari-
ables and outcome measures, they can also be estimated simultaneously as a single equation with
two-endogenous variables and two instruments.
In actuality, the quasi-experiment that we exploit randomizes participants among a total of 31 con-
tractors, with 2 or 3 contractors serving each of 12 randomization districts. If assumptions (4) and (5)
are applicable in this broader setting, they require that the contrast among any two contractors within
a randomization district is due to causal variation in either direct-hire or temporary-help placement
rates but not both. We take a statistical approach to assessing the applicability of the identifying
assumptions. Assumptions (4) and (5) imply that the instruments for temporary-help and direct-hire
placements are independent. That is, the Z2 instrument vector induces no variation in temporary-
help placements and the Z1 instrument vector induces no variation in direct-hire placements. If this
independence condition holds, estimates of δ1 and δ2 using all Z’s as instruments should be statisti-
cally indistinguishable whether estimated simultaneously, as a system of two equations, or estimated
individually, one endogenous variable at a time. In section 6 we directly test this implication and
accept the null that estimates of δ1 and δ2 are invariant to whether these parameters are estimated
individually or simultaneously. We interpret our main results as reﬂecting the Local Average Treat-
ment Eﬀect of temporary-help and direct-hire job placements on complier subpopulations in the Work
First population, though the ‘locally constant’ interpretation is also possible.
The LATE framework also highlights a subtlety for the interpretation of our ﬁndings. Since the
complier populations for the temporary-help and direct-hire treatments are potentially distinct, our
analysis does not directly estimate the temporary-help treatment eﬀect for the direct-hire complier
population or the direct-hire treatment eﬀect for the temporary-help complier population.11 In Section
7, we use methods proposed by Abadie (2002) to infer the characteristics of the subpopulations whose
placement into temporary-help and direct-hire jobs was impacted by contractor assignment and ﬁnd
that these subpopulations are largely comparable along dimensions of prior earnings and employment.
This in turn suggests that the treatment eﬀects of direct-hire and temporary-help employment may
also be comparable for these subpopulations.
11That is, our experiment provides estimates of E [Y1 − Y0|D11 >D 10] and E [Y2 − Y0|D22 >D 20] but does not provide
estimates of E [Y1 − Y0|D22 >D 20] and E [Y2 − Y0|D11 >D 10].
113 The Research Design
Our research data comprise Work First administrative records data linked to quarterly earnings from
the State of Michigan’s unemployment insurance wage records data base. We use administrative data
on all Work First spells initiated from the fourth quarter of 1999 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2003
in Detroit. The administrative data contain detailed information on jobs obtained by participants
while in the Work First program. To classify jobs into direct-hire and temporary-help, we use the
names of employers at which participants obtained jo b si nc o n j u n c t i o nw i t hc a r e f u l l yc o m p i l e dl i s t so f
temporary-help agencies in the metropolitan area.12 The UI data include total earnings by employer
for each calendar quarter. The data also identify the industry category of each employer. We use
these data to construct pre- and post- Work First UI earnings for each participant for the eight to
twelve quarters prior to and subsequent to the Work First placement.13
In the time period studied, fourteen districts in Detroit were served by two or more Work First
contractors, thus making these districts potentially usable for our analysis. However, in two districts
with large ethnic populations, the assignment of participants to contractors was not done on a rotating
basis but rather was based on language needs. Thus, we drop these two districts from our sample.
We further limit the sample to spells initiated when participants were between the ages of 16 and
64 and drop spells where reported pre- or post-assignment quarterly UI earnings exceed $15,000 in a
single calendar quarter. These restrictions reduce the sample by less than 1 percent. Finally, we drop
all spells initiated in a calendar quarter in any district where one or more participating contractors
received no clients during the quarter, as occasionally occurred when contractors were terminated and
replaced.14
Table 1 summarizes the means of variables on demographics, work history, and earnings following
program entry for all Work First participants in our primary sample as well as by placement outcome
during the Work First spell: direct-hire placement, temporary-help placement, or no job placement.
The sample is predominantly female (94 percent) and black (97 percent). Slightly under half (48
percent) of Work First spells resulted in job placements. Among spells resulting in jobs, 20 percent have
at least one job with a temporary agency. The average earnings and total quarters of employment over
12Particularly helpful was a comprehensive list of temporary agencies operating in our metropolitan area as of 2000,
developed by David Fasenfest and Heidi Gottfried. In a small number of cases where the appropriate coding of an
employer was unclear, we collected additional information on the nature of the business through an internet search or
telephone contact.
13The UI wage records exclude earnings of federal and state employees and of the self-employed.
14This further reduced the ﬁnal sample by 3,091 spells, or 7.4 percent. We have estimated the main models including
these observations with near-identical results.
12the eight quarters following program entry are comparable for those obtaining temporary agency and
direct-hire jobs, while earnings and quarters of employment for those who do not obtain employment
during the Work First spell are 40 to 50 percent lower.15
The average characteristics of participants vary considerably according to job outcome. Those who
do not ﬁn dj o b sw h i l ei nW o r kF i r s ta r em o r el i k e l yt oh a v ed r o p p e do u to fh i g hs c h o o l ,h a v ew o r k e d
fewer quarters before entering the program, and have lower prior earnings than those who ﬁnd jobs.
Among those placed in jobs, those taking temporary agency jobs actually have slightly higher average
prior earnings and quarters worked than those taking direct-hire jobs. Not surprisingly, those who take
temporary jobs while in the Work First program have higher prior earnings and more quarters worked
in the temporary-help sector than those who take direct-hire jobs. Data used in previous studies show
that blacks are much more likely than whites to work in temporary agency jobs (Autor and Houseman
2002b; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2005). Even in our predominantly African-American sample, we
also ﬁnd this relationship.
3.1 Testing the research design
Our identiﬁcation relies on the assumption that the rotational assignment of participants to Work
First contractors eﬀectively randomizes participants across contractors operating within each district
within a particular program year.16 We test this assumption by statistically comparing the following
eight characteristics of participants assigned to contractors within each district and year: sex, white
race, other (non-white) race, age and its square, number of quarters worked in the eight quarters
before program entry, number of quarters employed with a temporary agency in these prior eight
quarters, total earnings in these prior eight quarters, and total earnings in the prior eight quarters
from temporary agencies.17
In testing the comparability of participant characteristics across eight characteristics, we are likely
to obtain many false rejections of the null, and this is exacerbated by the fact that participant charac-
teristics are not fully independent. To account for these confounding factors, we estimate a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) system to test the hypothesis that the observed distribution of partic-
15Participants who do not ﬁnd jobs during their Work First assignments face possible sanctions. Thus, unsuccessful
participants continue to have strong return-to-work incentives after leaving Work First.
16Contractors sign annual contracts with the City of Detroit, and the set of contractors servicing a district may change
from year to year.
17Because of the large number of missing values for the education measures, and because some contractors were
apparently more diligent than others about recording participant education, we exclude education variables from both
the randomization test and subsequent statistical analysis. Regression results that include these variables (including an
“education missing” variable) are nearly identical to our main results.
13ipant covariates across contractors within each randomization district and year is consistent with
chance.18 The SUR accounts for both the multiple comparisons problem and the correlations among
demographic characteristics across participants at each contractor.
O u rp r o c e d u r ei sa sf o l l o w s .L e tX be an 8 × N matrix containing the 8 baseline covariates listed
above for each of the N Work First spells assigned to contractors in all district and years of our sample.
Let D be an N × k matrix of k indicator variables designating the district-year in which each spell
is assigned (of which there are 41 in our sample). Let Z be a N × (j − k) matrix containing a set of
j −k indicator variables designating the contractor and year to which each spell is assigned, with one
indicator omitted for each of the k district-year pairs. Finally, let λ be a j × 1 vector of parameters
to be estimated and I8 be the 8 × 8 identity matrix. We estimate the following SUR model:




In this expression, Y is an 8 · N× 1 vector containing the 8 rows of X transposed and stacked in
a column vector, and ϕ is a matrix of error terms that allows for cross-equation correlations among
participant characteristics at each contractor.19 The p-value of a test that the ﬁrst j − k elements of
λ in this regression system are jointly equal to zero provides an omnibus test for the null hypothesis
that participant covariates do not diﬀer among participants assigned to diﬀerent contractors within a
district and year. A high p-value corresponds to an acceptance of this null.
Appendix Table 1 provides the chi-square statistics and p-values of tests of the null hypothesis
for estimates of Equation (5) for each of the 41 district-by-year cells in the sample. Consistent with
the expectation that the rotational assignment of participants across contractors operating within
districts is functionally equivalent to random assignment, the overall p-value of the randomization test
is 0.44, which is highly consistent with a chance distribution of covariates. Performing this statistical
comparison individually for the 41 district-years in the sample, we ﬁnd that 39 of 41 comparisons
accept the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level or higher, and only one comparison rejects the null
at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. In the ﬁnal row and column of the table, we also provide the
p-value for the comparison test for each year, pooling across districts, and each district, pooling across
years. All but one of these sixteen tests readily accepts the null at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
In net, these results support the hypothesis that the rotational assignment of participants across
contractors generates variation that can be treated as random.
18This method for testing randomization across multiple outcomes is proposed by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) in
their Web Appendix available at www.nber.org/~kling/mto/mto_exp_a.pdf.
19Since the j contractor dummies in Z are mutually exclusive, one is dropped.
14Our research design also requires that random assignment to contractors signiﬁcantly aﬀects par-
ticipant job placements. To conﬁrm this, we estimated a set of SUR models akin to equation (5)
where the dependent variables are participant Work First job outcomes (direct-hire, temporary-help,
non-employment). Here, our expectation is that job placement outcomes should diﬀer signiﬁcantly
across contractors within a district and year. Tests of this hypothesis provide strong support for the
eﬃcacy of the research design: the omnibus test for cross-contractor, within district-year diﬀerences
in job placement outcomes rejects the null at below the 1 percent level for the full sample, as do 16
of 17 tests for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in placement rates across all districts within a year or within a
district across all years.20
4 Main Results: The Effects of Job Placements on Earnings and Employment
We now use the linked quarterly earnings records from the state of Michigan’s unemployment insurance
system to assess how Work First job placements aﬀect participants’ earnings and employment over the
subsequent two to three years following the calendar quarter of random assignment to contractor.21
Our primary empirical model is:
Yicdt = α + β1Di + β2Ti + Xiβ3 + γd + φt + θdt + εicdt , (6)
where the dependent variable is real earnings or quarters of employment (from UI records) following the
quarter of Work First assignment. Subscripts i, d, c,a n dt refer, respectively to participants, placement
districts, contractors, and year by quarter of participant assignment. The indicator variables Di and
Ti code if participant i obtained either a direct-hire or temporary-help job placement during her Work
First spell (with both equal to zero if no placement was obtained).
A set of pre-determined control variables are contained in X, including sex, race (white, black,
or other), age, and measures of quarters of UI employment and real UI earnings in direct-hire and
temporary-help employment in the 8 quarters prior to contractor assignment. The vectors γ and φ
contain a complete set of dummies indicating randomization districts and year by quarter of contractor
20A table of results is available from the authors. We also calculate partial R-squared values from a set of regressions
of job placement type (any job placement, direct-hire job placement, temporary-help job placement) on dummy variables
indicating contractor-by-year of assignment after ﬁrst orthogonalizing these job placement types with respect to demo-
graphic, earnings history, and time variables; conversely, we compute partial R-squared values from regressions of job
placement types on demographic, earnings history, and time variables after ﬁrst orthogonalizing the dependent variable
with respect to contractor assignment. We ﬁnd that contractor assignment explains 85 to 130 percent as much variation
in job placement type as do demographic, earnings history, and time variable combined.
21For a subset of participants, those assigned prior to 2003, we have 12 quarters of outcome data. We analyze these
longer term outcomes for this subsample in Table 4.
15assignment, while the vector θ contains all two-way interactions between district and year.22 To
account for the grouping of participants within contractors, we use Huber-White robust standard
errors clustered by contractor (33 clusters).
There is no mechanical linkage between job placements occurring during the Work First spell
and earnings and employment outcomes observed in the UI data in post-assignment quarters. The
job placement variables on the right-hand side of equation (6), D and T, refer to jobs obtained
during the Work First spell and are coded using welfare case records from the city of Detroit. The
dependent variable, by contrast, is obtained from state of Michigan unemployment insurance records
and measures labor market outcomes in the quarters following Work First assignment. It is therefore
possible–in fact, commonplace–for a participant who obtains a job placement during Work First to
have no earnings in the ﬁrst quarter following program participation and, conversely, for a participant
who receives no placement to have positive earnings in the post-assignment quarter.
In general, we would not expect equation (6) to recover unbiased estimates of the causal eﬀects
of job placements on participant outcomes when estimated using Ordinary Least Squares,. Only
about half of Work First participants in our sample obtain employment during their Work First spell
(Table 1), and this set of participants is likely to be more skilled and motivated to work than average
participants. Unless these attributes are fully captured by the covariates in X, estimates of β1 and β2
are likely to be biased.
We address this bias by instrumenting D and T in equation (6) with contractor-by-year-of-
assignment dummy variables as outlined in section 2. Our use of contractor-by-year dummy variables
as instruments is almost identical to the use of contractor-by-year placement rates as instruments.23
For expositional purposes we rewrite equation (6) as,
Yicdt = α + π1 ¯ Dct + π2 ¯ Tct + Xiβ3 + γd + φt + θdt + νct + ωicdt , (7)
where ¯ Dct is the observed direct-hire placement rate of contractor c in year t and ¯ Tct is the correspond-
ing placement rate in temporary-help employment. The error term in this equation is partitioned into
22To conserve degrees of freedom, we do not include district by year by calendar quarter interactions. Models that
include these additional dummy variables produce near-identical results and are available from the authors.
23It is almost identical because the estimates will diﬀer to the degree that there is sample correlation between con-
tractor dummies and participant characteristics. Due to the randomization of participants to contractors, however, this
correlation is insigniﬁcant (Appendix Table 1). Accordingly, point estimates for 2SLS models are near-identical when
using either placement rates or dummy variables as instruments.
An instrument analogous to equation (7) that uses means rather than ﬁxed eﬀe c t si se m p l o y e db yK l i n g( 2 0 0 5 ) ,w h o
develops sentence-length propensity instruments for federal judges by regressing observed sentence outcomes on judge
ﬁxed eﬀects and other covariates. Kling uses the estimated judge eﬀects (a single, continuous variable) as an instrument
for the sentence lengths of defendants randomly assigned to each judge.
16two additive components, eicdt = νct+ωicdt.T h eﬁrst is a contractor-by-year random eﬀect, ν,r e ﬂect-
ing unobserved contractor heterogeneity that aﬀect participant outcomes but do not operate through
job placement rates. The second is a participant-spell speciﬁc iid random error component.
Equation (7) underscores two key conditions that our identiﬁcation strategy requires for valid
inference. First, as per assumption (1) of the econometric framework, unobserved factors aﬀecting
earnings, ω, must be uncorrelated with ¯ Dct and ¯ Tct, a condition that should be satisﬁed by the
rotational assignment design. The second condition is that any contractor-by-year random eﬀects, if
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validity of our research does not r e q u i r et h a tc o n t r a c t o r so n l ya ﬀect participant outcomes through
job placements. It does require, however, that these non-placement eﬀects are not systematically
correlated with contractor job placement rates, because this would cause 2SLS estimates of equation
(6) to misattribute the eﬀects of unobserved contractor quality to job placement rates. As outlined in
the Introduction, almost all Work First resources are devoted to job placement, and few other support
services are provided to participants beyond the set of standardized services oﬀered by the city of
Detroit to all participants. Though this cannot be proven from the data, we believe it is highly unlikely
that diﬀerences in contractor practices that are not directly the result of job placements can plausibly
account for the very large eﬀects we detect of contractor assignments on participant outcomes. We
proceed under the assumption that the uncorrelated random eﬀects condition is satisﬁed and examine
corroborating evidence in Section 6.
4.1 Ordinary least squares estimates
To facilitate comparison with prior studies of the impact of temporary-help and direct-hire job taking
on labor market advancement of welfare participants and other low-earnings workers (e.g., Heinrich,
Mueser and Troske 2005, 2007; Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005, 2007), we begin our analysis with
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (6). Table 2 presents OLS estimates for real
earnings and quarters of employment for Work First participants in the ﬁrst 8 quarters following their
assignment to Work First contractors using all 37,163 spells in our data. For ease of interpretation,
we re-center all control variables by subtracting the mean for participants who did not obtain a job
during their Work First spell. Thus, by construction, the intercept in equation (6) equals the mean
of the outcome variable for Work First participants not placed into jobs.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 shows that, conditional on detailed controls for race, age and prior em-
17ployment and earnings, participants who obtained any employment during their Work First spell were
36 percentage points more likely to be employed in the ﬁrst quarter following contractor assignment
and earned on average $804 more than clients who did not obtain employment. As indicated by the
intercepts of these equations, only 33 percent of participants who did not obtain employment during
the Work First spell were employed in the post-assignment quarter, and average earnings among these
participants was $494.
Column (2) distinguishes post-Work First outcomes for those taking temporary-help from those
taking direct-hire jobs during their Work First spells. Participants who obtained a temporary-help
position during their Work First spell were slightly more likely to have any employment in the ﬁrst
post-assignment quarter and earned about 90 dollars less on average than participants who obtained
a direct-hire placement.24 Though this earnings diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant, it is not econom-
ically large.
Subsequent columns of Table 2 summarize outcomes over longer time horizons following Work First
assignment. Participants who obtained a job placement during Work First earned an average of 62
percent more ($4,255) and worked 37 percent more quarters (1.32) over the subsequent eight quarters
than did participants who did not obtain a job while in Work First. The earnings and employment
gap between those obtaining temporary-help and direct-hire jobs during Work First cumulates slightly
over this longer time window, but in each case remains under 10 percent over the eight quarters and is
small relative to the substantial gap in employment and earnings between those who took jobs during
Work First and those who did not.
These OLS estimates are consistent with other published ﬁndings, most notably with Heinrich,
Mueser and Troske (2005 and 2007). They ﬁnd that Missouri and North Carolina welfare recipients
who obtained temporary-help jobs in 1993 and 1997 earned almost as much over the subsequent two
years as those who obtained direct-hire employment–and earned much more than did non job-takers.
Like Heinrich et al., our primary empirical models for earnings and employment are estimated for
a relatively homogeneous and geographically concentrated population and include detailed controls
for observable participant demographic characteristics and prior earnings. Similar to our estimates,
Heinrich et al. report that welfare participants taking temporary-help jobs earned at least 85 percent
of that of workers taking non-temporary-help jobs over the next eight calendar quarters. Though
24As shown in Table 1, temporary-help jobs typically pay hourly wages above those of direct-hire jobs. Thus, the lower
post-assignment earnings–despite higher employment rates—of participants obtaining temporary-help placements likely
reﬂects the fact that temporary-help spells are typically short, so total quarterly earnings are lower.
18less directly comparable, our ﬁndings also echo those of Andersson, Holzer and Lane (2005, 2007)
who report that low-skilled and low-earnings workers who obtain temporary-help jobs typically fare
relatively well in the labor market over the subsequent three years, despite starting with lower earnings.
These observations provide some assurance that our sample from the city of Detroit is comparable
with that used in other studies of job-taking among welfare recipients and other low-skilled workers.
Moreover, the rough agreement between our OLS estimates and those of Heinrich et al. for the
relationship between temporary-help job-taking and subsequent earnings suggests that the diﬀerences
in causal estimates that we report below from instrumental variable models are due to substantive
diﬀerences in research design rather than discrepancies in sample frame.
4.2 Instrumental variables estimates
Table 3 reports instrumental variables estimates of equation (6) for the impact of Work First job
placements on post-assignment employment and earnings, where employment placements during the
Work First spell are instrumented by contractor-by-year assignments. The column (1) estimate con-
ﬁrms an economically large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of Work First job placements on earnings
a n de m p l o y m e n ti nt h eﬁrst post-assignment quarter. Obtaining any job placement is estimated to
raise the probability of employment in quarter 1 following Work First by 28 percentage points and to
increase earnings by $621. These eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant and are about 75 percent as large as
the corresponding OLS estimates (Table 2).
Column (2) distinguishes between the causal eﬀects of temporary-help and direct-hire job place-
ments. Notably, both types of job placements signiﬁcantly improve labor market outcomes in the ﬁrst
post-assignment quarter. Direct-hire and temporary-help placements respectively raise ﬁrst-quarters
earnings by $722 and $420 and increase the probability of any ﬁrst-quarter employment by 35 and
15 percentage points, respectively. Although the temporary-help point estimates are smaller than
those for direct-hire, they are statistically signiﬁcantly from zero and, in the case of earnings, not
statistically distinguishable from the direct-hire point estimate. Thus, Work First placements in both
temporary-help and direct-hire jobs raise employment and earnings of welfare participants in the near
term.
Subsequent columns of Table 3 show that the employment and earnings eﬀects of direct-hire place-
ments persist well beyond the ﬁrst quarter. In the two years following Work First assignment, direct-
hire placements induced by contractor assignments raise earnings and employment on average by a
19substantial and highly signiﬁcant amount: the estimated earnings eﬀect is $2,452 in the ﬁrst year and
$1,720 in the second, while the employment eﬀect is 0.94 quarters in the ﬁrst year and 0.45 quarters
in the second.25
Enduring earnings and employment eﬀects are not, however, apparent for temporary-help place-
ments. The estimated impact of a temporary-help placement on employment and earnings in quarters
two through eight is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and is generally weakly negative. For exam-
ple, we estimate that temporary-help placements insigniﬁcantly lower eight quarter earnings by $1,190
and quarters of employment by 0.09. As shown in the bottom row of each column, we consistently
reject the hypothesis that the impact of temporary-help and direct-hire placements on either earnings
or employment is comparable.
The precision of the estimates rules out even moderately positive eﬀects. The 95 percent conﬁdence
interval of the estimates excludes earnings gains larger than $768 and employment gains larger than
0.37 quarters in the two years following a temporary-help placement. These best-case scenarios are
less than a third as large as the mean estimates for the earnings and employment eﬀects of direct-hire
placements. Thus, the gains from temporary-help placements detected in the ﬁrst quarter following
Work First assignment appear transitory. In light of the fact that 20 percent of jobs obtained in Work
First are temporary-help positions (Table 1), this ﬁnding is noteworthy.
Figure 2 provides further detail on these results by plotting point estimates and 95 conﬁdence
intervals for analogous 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of direct-hire and temporary-help job placements
on employment probability and earnings for each of eight quarters following Work-First assignment.
The ﬁgure shows that direct-hire placements signiﬁcantly raise both earnings and the probability of
employment in the ﬁrst six of eight post-assignment quarters (seven quarters in the case of earnings).
These impacts begin to diminish after the ﬁfth quarter, consistent with some fade-out of beneﬁts.
By contrast, estimated impacts of temporary-help placements on employment and earnings are only
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the ﬁrst quarter.
Analysis of outcomes of Work First participants over a three (rather than two) year horizon rein-
forces these conclusions.26 Estimates in Table 4 show that earnings gains from direct-hire placements
25The evidence suggesting that the beneﬁts of job placements fade with time echoes the ﬁndings of Card and Hyslop
(2005) who ﬁnd, in the context of a Canadian welfare program, that initial job accessions induced by a time-limited
earnings subsidy tend to peak after approximately 15 months, and in the limit, do not produce permanent earnings gains.
Of course, a job placement that raises earnings and employment for two full years may still be viewed as successful from
a policy perspective.
26To study outcomes over this longer interval, we limit the sample to participants who were assigned prior to 2002 and
thus for whom we have three full years of outcome data.
20persist and remain statistically signiﬁcant into the third post-assignment year. We estimate that a
direct-hire placement raises earnings by approximately $8,900 over three years, which is quite sub-
stantial relative to the mean earnings of Work First participants. Although statistically signiﬁcant in
each of the three post-assignment years, this impact fades in the third year. The estimated earnings
gain are $3,244 in year one, $3,593 in year two and $2,064 in year three.
Table 4 also conﬁrms the result that temporary-help placements do not improve long-term employ-
ment and earnings outcomes. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the eﬀects of temporary-help
placements on earnings and employment are zero in each of the three years following Work First
assignment. These results are informative: the estimated impact of a temporary-help placement on
earnings is signiﬁcantly below the corresponding direct-hire eﬀect in each year. And we can reject with
95 percent conﬁdence that a temporary-help placement raises earnings by more than $980 in total for
the full three year post-assignment period.27
Our results provide clear evidence that direct-hire job placements induced by Work First con-
tractor assignments substantially increase earnings and employment of Work First clients over the
subsequent two to three years. In contrast to previous research, we ﬁnd no evidence that comparable
beneﬁts accrue from temporary-help placements. Next we explore why temporary-help and direct-hire
placements appear to have such divergent impacts on subsequent earnings and employment.
5 The dynamics of job placements and employment stability
Ideally, Work First job placements would result in sustained employment; participants placed into jobs
during the program would remain in those jobs or would change employers with little or no interruption
to employment. We assess the degree to which job placements lead to sustained employment, which
we deﬁne as being continuously employed for the ﬁrst t quarters following Work First participation,
where t ∈ {1, ..., 8} in our data. 28
To provide a baseline of comparison, panel A of Figure 3 plots the probability of continuous
27The standard errors in Tables 3 through 5 do not account for potential serial correlation in outcomes among partici-
pants with multiple spells. The 37,163 Work First spells in our data correspond to 24,903 unique participants, 67 percent
of whom have one spell, 22 percent of whom have 2 spells, and 11 percent of whom have 3 or more spells. To assess the
importance of this issue, we re-estimate models for total earnings and quarters worked over eight quarters using only
the ﬁrst Work First spell per participant observed in our data. These ﬁrst-spell estimates, reported in Appendix Table
2, are largely comparable to our main estimates for earnings and employment in Tables 3 and 4. Standard errors are
approximately one-third larger, consistent with the ﬁfty percent reduction in sample size. As in prior tables, earnings and
employment impacts of direct-hire placements remain positive and highly signiﬁcant while impacts of temporary-help
placements are both negative and signiﬁcantly below the direct-hire estimates. Notably, the point estimates for the
eﬀects of temporary-help placements are modestly statistically signiﬁcant in this sub-sample.
28An employment spell requires positive earnings in sequential quarters but does not necessarily imply ongoing em-
ployment with a particular employer. Similarly, it need not be the case that the job placement obtained during the Work
First spell is the same job as one observed in the UI data in the ﬁrst post-assignment quarter.
21employment in the eight post-assignment quarters among those who were not placed into jobs during
the program. The height of the ﬁrst bar represents the unconditional probability of employment
in post-assignment quarter one for participants not receiving a job placement during their Work
First spell, and the height of subsequent bars the probability of ongoing employment in quarters two
through eight for the complete set of non-placed participants (thus, the height of the second bar is
by construction less than or equal to that of the ﬁrst bar). The ﬁgure shows that 33 percent of
participants not placed into jobs while in Work First obtain employment in the ﬁrst post-assignment
quarter, and 23 percent both ﬁnd employment in the ﬁrst quarter and maintain it into the second.
By the eighth quarter, the share in ongoing employment falls to 8 percent.
Two-stage least squares estimates summarized in Panel B of Figure 3 reveal that direct-hire place-
ments signiﬁcantly raise the survivor probability of ongoing employment in all eight quarters following
Work-First assignment. In the ﬁrst quarter, this impact is 36 percentage points. It declines to 18
percentage points in the fourth quarter and 6 percentage points in the eighth quarter. Comparing
the causal eﬀects estimates in panel B with the baseline numbers in panel A, we see that direct-hire
placements approximately double the probability of ongoing employment in each of the eight post-
assignment quarters. Temporary-help placements also raise the survivor probability, with an impact
of 16 percentage points in the ﬁrst quarter and 10 percentage points in the second (both signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level). These impacts are relatively short-lived, however, and the point estimates fall
to zero by the fourth quarter.
Because continuous employment may be harder to maintain for workers who repeatedly switch
employers, it is informative to directly evaluate how job placements aﬀect the long-term probability
that participants work for a single primary employer. We assess this outcome ﬁrst by estimating a set
of 2SLS linear models for the probability that participants have either a single employer or multiple
employers in each of the quarters following job placement (with no employer as the omitted category).
These estimates, summarized in Figure 4, reveal that direct-hire placements signiﬁcantly raise the
probability that participants work for a single employer (though not necessarily the same employer)
in each of the eight quarters following placement. This eﬀect is substantial, equal to 23 percentage
points in the ﬁrst quarter, 20 percentage points in the fourth quarter, and 11 percentage points in
the eighth quarter. Notably, direct-hire placements also raise the probability that participants work
for multiple employers in each of the ﬁrst two post-assignment quarters, suggesting an initial increase
in job shopping or churn. But this eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant by the third quarter, and the point
22estimate is essentially zero thereafter. Thus, direct-hire placements lead to a near-term increase in
multiple job-holding, and a near and longer-term increase in single job-holding.29
Figure 4 reveals a sharply contrasting pattern for temporary-help placements. Temporary-help
placements signiﬁcantly raise the probability that participants work for multiple employers in seven
of the eight post-assignment quarters. At the same time, they signiﬁcantly reduce the probability
that participants work for a single employer in four of eight post-assignment quarters. Because the
estimated reduction in the probability of single job-holding is on average larger than the estimated
increase in the probability of multiple job-holding, temporary-help placements slightly reduce the
probability that participants work at all (see also Figure 2).
If direct-hire employment signiﬁcantly increases the probability of employment with a single em-
ployer within a particular quarter, it is likely that it also increases the probability of continued employ-
ment with a single employer across quarters. We suspect this is especially important for understanding
the positive impacts of direct-hire job placements on subsequent employment and earnings because,
in the two years following Work First participation, the majority of participants receive the bulk of
their labor income from a continuous job spell with a single employer. For participants with positive
earnings, the mean ratio of earnings in the longest-held job to total eight-quarter earnings is 80 percent
with a standard deviation of 24 percent.30
Table 5 illustrates the centrality of long job spells to the positive earnings and employment eﬀects of
direct-hire placements. For each participant, we code their longest employment spell and their longest
held job observed in the eight quarters following Work First assignment.31 Table 5 shows that of the
$4,173 in additional eight-quarter earnings resulting from a direct-hire job placement, $3,885 accrues
during the longest employment spell, and $3,107 accrues in the longest job (74 percent of the total).
Similarly, of the 1.4 quarters of additional employment resulting from a direct-hire job placement,
0.9 quarters on average accrue from a single job. Thus, most of the future gains in employment and
earnings resulting from direct-hire job placements come from increases in the longest job spell and the
associated earnings from that spell.
29Comparing Figure 3 for multiple job-holding with Figure 2 for any employment shows that the initial ‘fade out’ of
the eﬀect of direct-hire placements on any employment is primarily due to a reduction in the number of participants
holding two-plus jobs. By comparison, the eﬀect of a direct-hire placement on the probability of holding a single job is
much more stable.
30In the full sample of 37,163 Work First spells, mean eight-quarter earnings are $9,469, mean earnings in the longest
employment spell are $8,801, and mean earnings in the longest job spell are $7,100.
31An employment spell is deﬁned as a set of contiguous quarters of positive earnings and job spell is deﬁn e da sas e t
of contiguous quarters with earnings from the same employer–though an individual may hold jobs with more than one
employer in a quarter and the precise ‘job’ with any employer may change. Where participants have multiple jobs of
the same length (in quarters), we break ties by using the highest earning spell. Note that the longest job spell is not
necessarily the highest-earnings job spell, though in the vast majority of cases it is.
23Temporary-help placements are not found to foster long job spells. We estimate that temporary-
help placements slightly reduce tenure and earnings in the longest job spell, and the adverse earnings
eﬀect of $1,966 is statistically signiﬁcant. Notably, earnings losses in the longest held job are larger
than estimated net earnings losses of $1,190. Thus, participants placed in temporary-help jobs partly
compensate for increased instability through greater employment and earnings in other jobs.
Why do temporary-help placements fail to generate an increase in job stability? Table 6 suggests
one answer: these placements do not lead to subsequent spells in direct-hire employment. This may
be seen by estimating the impact of temporary-help and direct-hire placements on employment and
earnings separately by employer type (that is, in temporary-help and direct-hire employment). Table
6 reveals that direct-hire job placements increase subsequent employment and earnings in direct-hire
jobs signiﬁcantly in both the ﬁrst and second year following Work First assignment. These earnings
impacts of $2,121 and $1,711 in years one and two are economically large–equal to essentially the
entire impact of direct-hire placements on earnings in all jobs. By implication, direct-hire placements
have no impact on earnings in temporary-help jobs.
Temporary-help placements signiﬁcantly raise earnings in temporary-help jobs but simultaneously
crowd out earnings in direct-hire jobs. Table 6 shows that in the ﬁrst post-assignment year, temporary-
help placements raise earnings and employment in temporary-help jobs by $1,042 and 0.49 quarters
respectively (both signiﬁcant) and reduce earnings and employment in direct-hire jobs by $1,470 and
0.38 quarters respectively (also signiﬁcant). Hence, there is essentially one-to-one crowd-out. In the
second post-assignment year, temporary-help placements have no eﬀect on earnings or employment in
either temporary-help or direct-hire jobs. Thus, despite much descriptive evidence to the contrary, we
ﬁnd in the Work First setting that temporary-help placements do not cause an increase in subsequent
earnings and employment in direct-hire jobs.32
Taken together, these results provide insights into the sharply diﬀerent causal eﬀects of direct-
hire and temporary-help placements on subsequent employment and earnings. Direct-hire placements
appear to generate durable earnings and employment eﬀects by fostering job stability: signiﬁcantly
increasing the subsequent probability of having one employer per quarter, raising tenure and earnings
in the longest-held job, and approximately doubling the probability of ongoing employment in all
32In a complementary analysis, we estimate that temporary-help placements raise the number of unique temporary-
help employers for whom a participant works by 0.60 over the ﬁrst eight quarters, and similarly, direct-hire placements
raise the number of unique direct-hire employers by 0.76. Temporary-help placements have no impact on the number
of direct-hire employers over eight quarters, however, and, analogously, direct-hire placements have no impact on the
number of temporary help employers.
24eight quarters following Work-First assignment. Temporary-help placements increase the probability
of having either two employers or no employer in a calendar quarter, reduce tenure and earnings in
the longest-held job, and fail to raise the probability that a worker maintains ongoing employment
after two quarters following placement. In net, temporary-help placements fail to foster transitions to
stable employment with direct-hire employers or even to increase employment with temporary-help
ﬁrms over the longer term.
6 Testing the Identification Framework
In this section, we probe two aspects of the identiﬁcation framework. We ﬁrst explore the robustness
of the main results to plausible alternative speciﬁcations of the instrumental variables. We then
consider the validity of the maintained assumption that contractor assignments only systematically
aﬀect participant outcomes through job placements.
6.1 Robustness and power of the instruments
As instrumental variables for job placements in Tables 3 through 7, we use contractor-by-year of as-
signment dummies. These instruments eﬃciently exploit relatively stable variation in contractors’ job
placement policies while allowing these policies to evolve from year to year. This over-time variation
in placement rates is relevant because, as is suggested by the survey results in Autor and Houseman
(2006), contractors have amended their placement polices in recent years, with a signiﬁcant fraction
reporting having reduced their use of temporary-help placements.33 As a robustness check on the
use of contractor-by-year dummies as instruments, we report in Table 7 estimates of our main em-
pirical model for employment and earnings using as instruments contractor assignments rather than
contractor-by-year assignments. For reference, we also report in column (1) the baseline estimates.
Point estimates from these contractor-only 2SLS models found in column (3) are comparable to the
baseline estimates. Although standard errors are somewhat larger as expected, these estimates have
suﬃcient power to aﬃrm the prior conclusions: direct-hire placements signiﬁcantly raise employment
and earnings, and these eﬀects are signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding eﬀects for temporary-
help placements, which in turn are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We can continue to exclude
at the 95 percent level temporary-help placement eﬀects on eight-quarter earnings larger than $426.
33In addition, a time interaction between contractor and year is likely warranted because changing economic conditions
aﬀect contractors’ ability to implement their preferred placement policies. For example, when temporary help positions
are scarce, observed percentage point diﬀerences among contractors in temporary-help placement rates are likely to
contract.
25Thus, even discarding the year-to-year variation in contractor placement rates, the main results are
supported.
A potential concern with the use of contractor-by-year (or contractor) placements as instrumental
variables, however, is that these instruments implicitly treat both past and contemporaneous variation
in job placements as exogenous. Under the assumption that participants’ assignments are eﬀectively
randomized by the rotational assignment structure, this contemporaneous variation should not be
problematic. Indeed, for purposes of statistical eﬃciency, it should be exploited. It is nevertheless
useful to conﬁrm that the estimates are robust to using variation in contractor placement rates purged
of contemporaneous variation. To perform this test, we construct for each participant i the instru-
mental variables ˆ Dict and ˆ Tict, which are equal to the observed job placement rates (direct-hire and
temporary-help, respectively) by year of assignment for all participants at a given contractor exclud-
ing the individual participant i and all other participants assigned in the same assignment cohort
to the same contractor. We deﬁne cohorts by the week of participant assignment because all par-
ticipants assigned to a contractor in a given week attend a week long Work First orientation at the
assigned contractor. Thus, their outcomes are particularly likely to be correlated due to contempo-
raneous shocks.34 Estimates of the main earnings and employment models for eight quarters using
as instrumental variables ˆ Dict and ˆ Tict (column 5 of Table 7) again prove comparable to the main
estimates.
A ﬁnal concern with use of contractor assignments as instruments is that they may suﬀer from the
weak instruments problem highlighted by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). According to conventional
rule of thumb tests (cf. Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002), weak instruments should not be an issue in our
application; the chi-square statistics for our instrumental variables are 895, 634, and 548 for overall
employment, temporary-help employment and direct-hire employment, respectively. As a further
check against weak instruments, we also report in even-numbered columns of Table 7 models for the
main outcomes that use a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator in place of
2SLS. Unlike 2SLS, LIML is approximately unbiased in the case of weak instruments (Angrist, Imbens
and Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Krueger, 2001). For either set of dummy instrumental variables–
contractor by year dummies or contractor dummies–LIML point estimates and standard errors are
34This instrument is analogous to that used by Doyle (2007), who studies the eﬀect of placement of abused or neglected
children into foster care by exploiting the rotational assignment of children to case workers who have diﬀerent propensities
to remove children from abusive homes. So that no contemporaneous variation is used in constructing the instrument,
case worker removal propensities are calculated using observed case worker placement rates from time periods other than
the one corresponding to the speciﬁc cases under study.
26closely comparable to their 2SLS counterparts. Thus, weak instruments do not appear to be a concern.
6.2 Assessing the exclusion restriction: Bad jobs or bad contractors?
Our identiﬁcation framework requires that contractors only systematically aﬀect participant outcomes
through their eﬀect on job placements.35 This exclusion restriction appears highly plausible. Based
on a detailed survey of Work First contractors in the Detroit area analyzed by this study (Autor
and Houseman 2006), we document that program funding is tight and few resources are spent on
anything but job placement. A standardized program of general or life skills training is provided in
the ﬁrst week of the program at all contractors. After the ﬁrst week, all contractors focus on job
placement. Support services intended to aid job retention, such as childcare and transportation, are
equally available to participants from all contractors and are provided outside the program. Thus,
there is little scope for contractors to substantially aﬀect participant outcomes through any modality
other than job placements.
As a further plausibility check on the exclusion restriction, we assess the importance of other con-
tractor practices or impacts on participant outcomes that are not related to job placements. Referring
to the reduced form version of our main estimating equation (7), we noted above the possibility that
contractors may aﬀect participant outcomes through practices that are uncorrelated with their place-
ment rates (represented by νct). For example, contractors might provide counseling or support services
that improve subsequent participant outcomes without directly aﬀecting Work First job placements.
This form of contractor heterogeneity is not intrinsically problematic for our identiﬁcation strategy
since it does not violate the identiﬁcation assumption that contractor-by-year random eﬀects are
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would suggest that our main statistical model, focused on job placements, provides a limited empirical
characterization of the channels by which contractors aﬀect participant outcomes.
We evaluate the importance of non-placement heterogeneity among contractors by testing the
hypothesis that the total eﬀect of contractor assignments on participant outcomes is captured by
contractor-by-year placement rates in temporary-help and direct-hire jobs. We ﬁr s te s t i m a t ee q u a t i o n
35To see the role of this exclusion restriction in our identiﬁcation strategy, consider a hypothetical case in which
Work First contractors who provide generally poor participants services also place a disproportionate share of their
assigned participants in temporary help jobs. Further, assume that temporary help jobs have the same causal eﬀect on
employment and earnings as direct-hire jobs. In this case, our 2SLS estimates would misattribute the eﬀect of receiving
a bad contractor assignment to the eﬀect of obtaining a temporary help job, leading to downward biased estimates of
the causal eﬀect of temporary-help placements on participant outcomes. Note that this scenario violates the exclusion
restriction because it assumes that contractors systematically aﬀect participant outcomes through practices that are








> 0 or both (see equation 11).
27(7) by OLS, using observed temporary-help and direct-hire placement rates ( ¯ Dct and ¯ Tct) as the main
explanatory variables. We then re-estimate equation (7), replacing the observed placement rates with
a complete set of contractor-by-year dummy variables. An F-test comparing the sum of squared
residuals from these two speciﬁcations tests whether the unrestricted model, containing 59 contractor-
by-year dummy variables, has signiﬁcantly more explanatory power for participant outcomes than the
restricted model in which these dummies are parameterized as ¯ Dct and ¯ Tct.36
This test yield a compelling result: we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of contractor practices on partici-
pant outcomes that are not captured by temporary-help and direct-hire placement rates. Speciﬁcally,
for both 8 quarter earnings and 8 quarter employment, we accept the null at the 42 and 15 percent
level, respectively, that the 59 contractor-by-year dummy variables have no additional explanatory
power for participant outcomes beyond simple mean contractor-by-year job placement rates in direct-
hire and temporary-help jobs. Notably, this test has substantial power against the null. If we in-
stead collapse the two separate job placement rate variables into a single measure that sums the two
¡ ¯ Pct = ¯ Tct + ¯ Dct
¢
, the F-test accepts the null at the 24 percent level (down from 42 percent) for 8
quarter earnings and rejects at the 4 percent level for 8 quarter employment. Thus, a parameteriza-
tion that distinguishes between the causal eﬀects of temporary-help and direct-hire placements is both
necessary and suﬃcient to statistically capture the full eﬀect of contractor assignments on participant
outcomes. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that it is temporary-help and direct-hire job
placements per se, rather than other contractor practices, that explain the sizable and robust eﬀects
of Work First contractor assignments on participant outcomes.
7 Interpreting the estimates
In this ﬁnal empirical section, we consider the interpretation of the results in light of the economet-
ric framework. We ﬁrst evaluate whether the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect interpretation of the
results is supported. We then explore the characteristics of the ‘complier’ group, whose Work First
job placement is aﬀected by contractor assignment and whose behavior thus identiﬁes the eﬀects of
temporary-help and direct-hire placements on earnings and employment outcomes.
36There are 100 contractor-by-year cells and 40 district-by-year dummy variables plus an intercept. This leaves 59
contractor-by-year dummies as instruments. The F-test of these restrictions is distributed F (J − M,N − J),w h e r eN
is the total count of observations, J is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, and J −M is the number of
parameters in the restricted model.
287.1 Testing the LATE assumptions
A LATE interpretation of our results assumes that the instrumental variables impacting direct-hire
placement are distinct from those variables impacting temporary-help placement (see section 2). We
test this assumption here by independently estimating equation (6) for both endogenous employment
variables (direct-hire, temporary-help) while using the full set of instrumental variables in each case.
In particular, consider the following three alternative models for participant outcomes:
Yicdt = α1 + β1Di + β2Ti + Xiβ3 + γd + φt + θdt + εicdt,














In the ﬁrst equation, both endogenous placement variables (temporary-help and direct-hire) are in-
cluded. In the second and third equations, only the direct-hire or temporary-help variable is included.
The independence assumption implies that β1 = β0
1 and β2 = β00
2, that is, the estimated causal eﬀects
of temporary-help and direct-hire placements on outcomes are invariant to whether these eﬀects are
estimated separately or jointly.
We test this implication by stacking three copies of the full data set (i.e., dependent and indepen-
dent variables and instruments) and estimating a pooled model for outcomes over eight quarters that
nests all three speciﬁcations while allowing for unrestricted error correlations among the estimates.37
Estimates, found in Appendix Table 3, are generally supportive of the independence assumptions. For
both earnings and employment, we accept the null of the joint equality of the job placement coeﬃcients
with p-values of 0.22 and 0.20 respectively.38
Inspection of the Appendix Table 3 estimates does suggest, however, that the independence as-
sumption is only approximately satisﬁed. In particular, 2SLS estimates of the impact of temporary-
help placements on eight-quarter employment and earnings change from being weakly negative in
speciﬁcations where the direct-hire dummy is included to being weakly positive in speciﬁcations where
it is not. To explore the source of this sensitivity, we estimate the following model:
¯ Dct = α + ς ¯ Tct + γd + φt + θdt + νct + ωct.
Here, the dependent variable is the contractor-year placement rate in direct-hire jobs and the key
independent variable is the contractor-year placement rate in temporary-help jobs. We obtain an
estimate of ˆ ς =0 .32 with a standard error of 0.15. This indicates that contractors that have relatively
37This is akin to a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model estimated by 2SLS.
38We also accept the null hypothesis at least the 0.07 percent level for each pair of coeﬃcients tested individually.
29high temporary-help placement rates also have relatively high direct-hire placement rates, and this
relationship is modestly statistically signiﬁcant.39 Accordingly, although the independence assumption
is satisﬁed at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, some caution is warranted in interpreting the 2SLS
estimates within the LATE framework. As discussed in section 1, even if the conditions for a LATE
interpretation are not met, our IV estimates still recover local treatment eﬀects under the assumption
that these eﬀects are constant among the complier population–that is, under the assumption that the
impact of temporary and direct-hire placements is constant among the subset of welfare participants
whose job placement type is altered by contractor assignment.
7.2 Who are the marginal temporary-help and direct-hire workers?
Under either the LATE or local constant eﬀects interpretation, our 2SLS estimates identify the eﬀect
of direct-hire and temporary-help placements for participants whose Work First job placement is
aﬀected by contractor assignment. To interpret these estimates, it is valuable to assess how the
characteristics of these compliers (‘marginal workers’) compare to the full set of job-takers in the
Work First population, and, moreover, how the complier populations for the temporary-help and
direct-hire treatments compare to one another.
To obtain estimates of the average characteristics of the complier populations we follow the ap-
proach proposed by Abadie (2002). Let X be a predetermined participant characteristic of interest
and D and T be a pair of dummy variables indicating whether a participant obtained a direct-hire
job or a temporary-help placement during her Work First spell. Consider the following regression
equation:
[Di + Ti] · Xicdt = α + κ1Di + κ2Ti + γd + θt +( γd × θt)+εicdt , (8)
where, as before, subscripts c, d,a n dt denote contractors, randomization districts, and year. By
construction, the dependent variable is equal to Xi if participant i obtained employment during the
Work First spell and zero otherwise. Estimated by OLS, the parameters ˆ κ1 and ˆ κ2 in equation (8)
recover the (conditional) mean values of demographic variable X for Work First participants who
obtained direct-hire and temporary-help placements respectively during their Work First spells.
Table 8 summarizes OLS estimates of equation (8) for participants’ earnings and employment, both
overall and in temporary-help jobs, in the 8 quarters prior to their Work First placement. Participants
who obtained direct-hire jobs during their Work First spell earned an average of $10,256 and worked
39This result does provide further evidence, however, against the hypothesis that low-quality contractors tend to use
temporary-help placements while high-quality contractors focus on direct-hire placements.
304.47 quarters in the 8 calendar quarters prior to their contractor assignment (column 1). Prior earnings
and employment for those who obtained temporary-help jobs are similar, equal to $10,457 and 4.52
quarters respectively (see also Table 1). One diﬀerence between the two groups is also apparent.
Participants who took temporary-help jobs during their Work First spell had approximately 60 to 70
percent higher earnings and employment in the temporary-help sector over the previous eight quarters
than those who took direct-hire placements, and both contrasts are signiﬁcant.
Now consider 2SLS estimates of equation (8), where the variables T and D are instrumented by
contractor-by-year of assignment dummies. Here, ˆ κ1 and ˆ κ2 estimate the average characteristics (X’s)
of “marginal workers”–that is, participants whose employment status is changed by the rotational
assignment (Abadie 2002, Lemma 2.1). To see this, consider a simpliﬁed example with only employ-
ment outcome, J ∈ {0, 1}, and a single treatment variable, Z ∈ {0, 1},t h a ta ﬀects the odds that
a participant obtains employment (J =1 ). Under standard LATE assumptions, a Wald estimate of
Equation (8) yields the following quantity:
ˆ κ =
E [X |J =1 ,Z=1]· E [J |Z =1]− E [X |J =1 ,Z=0]· E [J |Z =0]
E [J |Z =1]− E [J |Z =0]
.
The numerator of this expression is a scaled contrast between the average Xof employed participants
in the treatment and control groups. The denominator rescales this contrast by the eﬀect of the
assignment to treatment on the probability of employment. The ratio of these two expressions provides
an estimate of the average X of compliers to the Z treatment.40
Two stage least squares estimates of (8) yield two key results. First, the prior earnings histories
of “marginal workers” are somewhat but not signiﬁcantly weaker than those of average workers.
Speciﬁcally, prior eight-quarter earnings and employment of marginal direct-hire workers are about
$200 and 0.12 quarters below those of average direct-hire workers while earnings and employment of
marginal temporary-help workers are about $1,750 and 0.40 quarters below those of average temporary-
help workers. Hausman tests (bottom row of each panel) do not, however, reject the null of the equality
of OLS and 2SLS estimates. Thus, the gap in earnings histories between marginal and average Work
First participants who ﬁnd employment during their Work First spells is not particularly stark. By
40A simple numerical example of the Abadie estimator illustrates. Let X be a dummy variable equal to one if a
participant is a high-school dropout and zero otherwise. Assume that 20 percent of treated participants and 10 percent
of control participants ﬁnd jobs during their Work First spells. Also assume that 70 percent of treated participants who
ﬁnd jobs are high school dropouts versus 50 percent of untreated participants. Using the above equation, these numbers
imply that 90 percent of marginally employed are high school dropouts. The intuition for this result is that the marginal
10 percent of employed participants must be composed of 90 percent high school dropouts to raise the average high school
dropout share among employed from 50 to 70 percent among the treated group. The fact that there are two treatments
(temporary-help and direct-hire) in our application does not change the interpretation of the Abadie estimator so long
as these treatments can be viewed as independent LATEs.
31implication, marginal participants have somewhat better earnings histories than average Work First
participants who do not ﬁnd employment during their Work First spells. In particular, Table 1 shows
that participants who do not ﬁnd employment during their Work First spells averaged $8,116 in
earnings and 3.83 quarters of employment in the 8 quarters prior to assignment. Both values are lower
than the corresponding estimates for marginal workers. In short, marginal workers appear slightly less
motivated or work-capable than average workers but slightly more motivated or work-capable than
average non-workers.
The second main result of Table 8 is that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the pre-
assignment work histories of marginal temporary-help and marginal direct-hire workers. This result
is most striking in the case of prior temporary-help employment and earnings. While the average
participant taking a temporary-help job has signiﬁcantly higher prior temporary-help earnings and
employment than the average participant taking a direct-hire job, there is no statistically or economi-
cally signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the temporary-help employment and earnings of marginal workers
taking temporary-help and direct-hire jobs.
Both of the Table 8 results bear on the interpretation of our ﬁndings. The rough comparability
in earnings histories between marginal and average workers obtaining job placements during their
Work First spells suggests that our estimates recover causal eﬀects estimates for a relevant complier
population–one that is slightly but not signiﬁcantly less motivated or work-capable than average
Work First participants. As critically, the comparability between the earnings histories of marginal
temporary-help and marginal direct-hire participants indicates that the causal eﬀects of direct-hire
and temporary-help placements are estimated on similar complier populations. By implication, the
marginal temporary-help workers in our sample would likely have fared signiﬁcantly better in terms
of subsequent employment and earnings had they instead been placed into direct-hire jobs, while the
marginal direct-hire workers in the analysis would likely have fared worse had they instead been placed
into temporary-help jobs.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The primary ﬁnding of our analysis is that direct-hire placements induced by the rotational assignment
of low-skilled workers to Work First contractors signiﬁcantly increase payroll earnings and quarters of
employment for marginal participants by two to three thousand dollars per year over the subsequent
one, two and three years. Although temporary-help placements signiﬁcantly raise employment and
32earnings in the temporary-help sector in the ﬁrst year following contractor assignment, they crowd out
employment and earnings in direct-hire jobs by roughly equal amounts, yielding a net eﬀect that is
statistically and economically close to zero. Thus, despite much descriptive evidence to the contrary,
our analysis indicates that temporary-help placements have no beneﬁcial or detrimental eﬀect on
earnings, employment or labor market advancement of low-skilled workers over any signiﬁcant time-
span.
These ﬁndings are pertinent to the economics literature on active labor market programs designed
to improve employment and earnings among low-skilled workers. Large-scale random assignment ex-
periments conducted with welfare-to-work and adult disadvantaged populations in the 1990s generally
found that, compared to more costly intervention strategies, job placement services were as eﬀective
or more eﬀective at improving subsequent labor market outcomes. In addition, on-going random
assignment experiments at 15 sites in eight states are currently assessing the eﬃcacy of various strate-
gies that are intended to address persistent problems of job instability and lack of advancement in the
welfare population (Bloom et al. 2005). While studies in this vein typically assess the net eﬀect of var-
ious program features–in addition to job search assistance–on Work First participant outcomes, our
study is the only analysis of which we are aware that directly assesses causal eﬀects of job placement
on recipients who receive them.41 This distinction proves important here. Although, consistent with
the experimental literature, we ﬁnd that job placements on average signiﬁcantly improve long-term
employment and earnings outcomes, our analysis also reveals that the beneﬁts of job placement ser-
vices derive entirely from placements into direct-hire jobs, which signiﬁcantly improve job stability and
the probability of on-going employment over the subsequent two years. Temporary-help placements,
which comprise fully one in ﬁve job placements in our Work First sample, do not foster transitions to
direct-hire jobs or improve any measure of job stability. Placements into temporary-help jobs are thus
no more eﬀective in raising earnings and labor force participation than is providing no placements at
all–at least in the Work First setting that we study.
We emphasize that our results pertain to the marginal temporary-help job placements induced by
the randomization of Work First participants across contractors, and therefore do not preclude the
possibility that infra-marginal temporary-help placements generate signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Nevertheless,
41Bloom et al. (1997) summarizes the results from 16 random assignment studies of the eﬃcacy of services provided
to participants in JTPA Title II-A programs, which serviced disadvantaged adults. Table 4 of that study compares the
estimated eﬀects of programs that rely on classroom training compared to programs that provide job placement and
on the job training services. Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) summarize the results from a series of studies of welfare
initiatives, all of which used random assignment research designs. These studies included analysis of the impact on
annual earnings of programs that emphasized job-search-ﬁrst and programs emphasizing education ﬁrst.
33these ﬁndings are particularly germane for the design of welfare programs. The operative question for
program design is whether job programs assisting welfare and other low-wage workers can improve
participants’ labor market outcomes by placing more clients in temporary agency positions. Our
analysis suggests not. While participants placed in direct-hire jobs beneﬁt substantially, workers
induced to take temporary jobs by contractor assignments are no better oﬀ than they would have
been without any job placement. This suggests that putting greater emphasis on placing participants
in direct-hire jobs is a more promising approach for increasing earnings and employment stability in
this population.
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Figure 2. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Direct-Hire and Temporary-Help Job Placements on Quarterly Earnings and 
Probability of Employment in Quarters 1 through 8 Following Work First Contractor Assignment.
Notes. Each pair of plotted points is from a separate 2SLS regressions of the indicated outcome variable for the relevant quarter on the 
direct-hire and temporary-help job placements instrumented by contractor-by-year of assignment. Confidence intervals are estimated with 
robust standard errors that are clustered on contractor assignment. Details of samples and control variables are given in Table 4.A. Baseline: Participants with No Job Placement
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Figure 3. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Direct-Hire and Temporary-Help Job 





Notes. Height of first quarter bar in panel A equals the unconditional probability of employment in 
quarter 1 following contractor assignment for participants receiving no placement during their Work 
First spell. Subsequent bars depict the survival probability in ongoing employment for non-placed 
participants obtaining employment in first quarter. Similarly, height of first quarter point estimate 
in panel B equals the causal effect of job placement during Work First spell on the probability of 
employment in quarter 1 following contractor assignment (relative to participants who are not 
placed). Subsequent point estimates depict causal effects on survival probabilities in ongoing 
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Figure 4. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Direct-Hire and Temporary-Help Job 
Placements on Probability of Holding One or Two-Plus Jobs in each of Eight Post-Assignment Quarters.
Notes. Estimates for each outcome (one employer, two-plus employers) are from separate 2SLS 
regressions of the indicated outcome variable for the relevant quarter on the direct-hire and 
temporary-help job placements instrumented by contractor-by-year of assignment. Confidence 
intervals are estimated with robust standard errors that are clustered on contractor assignment. 
Details of samples and control variables are given in Table 4.
95% CI 1 employer
95% CI 2+ employers
95% CI 1 employer
95% CI 2+ employersMean Std. error Mean Std. error Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
Percent of sample 100.0 51.9 38.4 9.8
Age 29.6 (0.04) 29.3 (0.06) 29.8 (0.06) 30.3 (0.13)
Female (%) 94.3 (0.12) 94.6 (0.16) 93.9 (0.20) 93.9 (0.40)
Black (%) 97.3 (0.08) 97.3 (0.12) 97.1 (0.14) 98.2 (0.22)
White/Other (%) 2.7 (0.08) 2.7 (0.12) 2.9 (0.14) 1.8 (0.22)
< High school (%) 37.2 (0.25) 40.1 (0.35) 33.8 (0.40) 35.3 (0.79)
High school (%) 35.5 (0.25) 33.6 (0.34) 37.6 (0.41) 37.8 (0.80)
> High school (%) 7.6 (0.14) 6.9 (0.18) 8.5 (0.23) 7.7 (0.44)
Unknown (%) 19.7 (0.21) 19.4 (0.28) 20.1 (0.34) 19.2 (0.65)
Wage earnings 9,190 (62) 8,116 (83) 10,310 (103) 10,499 (200)
Qtrs employed 4.15 (0.01) 3.83 (0.02) 4.48 (0.02) 4.52 (0.04)
Direct hire earnings 7,958 (59) 7,020 (79) 9,093 (100) 8,484 (189)
Qtrs direct hire employment 3.32 (0.01) 3.05 (0.02) 3.70 (0.02) 3.32 (0.04)
Temp help earnings 1,089 (17) 967 (22) 1,067 (26) 1,829 (71)
Qtrs temp employment 0.76 (0.01) 0.73 (0.01) 0.71 (0.01) 1.12 (0.03)
Wage earnings 9,469 (64) 6,949 (79) 12,323 (112) 11,637 (214)
Qtrs employed 3.91 (0.01) 3.16 (0.02) 4.73 (0.02) 4.66 (0.04)
Direct hire earnings 8,271 (62) 6,059 (75) 11,219 (109) 8,441 (195)
Qtrs direct hire employment 3.25 (0.01) 2.59 (0.02) 4.16 (0.02) 3.13 (0.04)
Temp help earnings 1,085 (19) 810 (22) 963 (30) 3,024 (101)
Qtrs temp employment 0.63 (0.01) 0.55 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 1.47 (0.03)
N
Table 1
Job Placement Outcome During Work First Spell
All No Employment Direct Hire Temporary Help
Summary Statistics for Primary Sample of Detroit Work First Participants 
Assigned to Contractors in 1999 - 2003
A. Demographics
B. Work History in Eight Quarters Prior to Contractor Assignment
C. Labor Market Outcomes in Eight Quarters Following Contractor Assignment
Sample is comprised of all Work First spells initiated from the fourth quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 
2003 in 12 Work First assignment districts in Detroit, Michigan. Data source is Detroit administrative records 
data from Work First programs linked to quarterly earnings from Michigan unemployment insurance wage 
records. Job placement outcomes and hourly earnings during Work First spell are coded using Detroit 
administrative records. Quarterly temporary-help and direct-hire earnings in eight quarters pre and post 
contractor assignment are coded using state of Michigan unemployment insurance records, where employer 
type is determined by industry codes. Work First Participants may have multiple spells. All earnings are 
inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).
37,163 19,278 14,255 3,630(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any job 804 * 1,719 * 1,733 * 4,255 *
(21) (58) (84) (142)
Direct Hire Job 826 * 1,779 * 1,821 * (4,426) *
(22) (66) (91) (157)
Temp Agency Job 716 * 1,476 * 1,380 * 3,572 *
(46) (99) (124) (227)
Constant 494 494 2,450 2,450 4,006 4,006 6,949 6,949
(11) (11) (33) (33) (43) (43) (76) (76)
R
2 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.27
H0:Temp=Direct 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Any job 0.36 * 0.52 * 0.44 * 1.32 *
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Direct Hire Job 0.36 * 0.53 * 0.45 * 1.34 *
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Temp Agency Job 0.38 * 0.49 * 0.39 * 1.26 *
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant 0.33 0.33 1.20 1.20 1.64 1.64 3.17 3.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
R
2 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.23
0.22 0.20 0.02 0.19
B. Quarters Employed
N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor (33 
clusters). Each column corresponds to a separate OLS regression. All models include dummy 
variables for year by quarter of assignment and assignment-district by year of assignment, and 
controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-squared, total quarters employed 
and total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in 
temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to 
Work First assignment. Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 




OLS Estimates of the Relationship between Work First Job Placements and Subsequent Earnings 
and Quarters of Employment One to Eight Quarters Following Work First Assignment: Participants 
Assigned 1999 - 2003
Quarter 1 Quarters 2 - 4 Quarters 5-8 Quarters 1-8(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any job 621 * 904 * 845 * 2,370 *
(143) (323) (397) (791)
Direct Hire Job 722 * 1,731 * 1,720 * 4,173 *
(161) (454) (621) (1,175)
420 * -729 ~ -882 -1,190
(206) (386) (583) (999)
Constant 579 560 2,829 2,673 4,419 4,254 7,827 7,487
(65) (65) (142) (166) (182) (227) (353) (426)
R
2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.25
H0:Temp=Direct 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.00
Any job 0.28 * 0.38 * 0.22 * 0.89 *
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.23)
Direct Hire Job 0.35 * 0.59 * 0.45 * 1.38 *
(0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.34)
0.15 ~ -0.02 -0.21 -0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.23)
Constant 0.36 0.35 1.26 1.22 1.74 1.70 3.37 3.27
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12)
R
2 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.21




N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor (33 
clusters). Each column corresponds to a separate 2SLS regression. Instrumental variables for jobs 
obtained (any, direct-hire and temporary-help) are contractor by year of assignment dummies. All 
models include dummy variables for year by quarter of assignment and assignment-district by year 
of assignment, and controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-squared, total 
quarters employed and total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters 
employed in temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in eight 
quarters prior to Work First assignment. Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the 




Instrumental Variables Estimates of The Effect of Work First Job Placements on Subsequent 
Earnings and Quarters of Employment One to Eight Quarters Following Work First Assignment: 
Participants Assigned 1999 - 2003
Quarter 1 Quarters 2 - 4 Quarters 5-8 Quarters 1-8OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Direct Hire 2,537 * 3,244 * 1,849 * 3,593 * 1,634 * 2,064 *
(102) (703) (111) (861) (134) (996)
2,013 * -861 1,327 * -706 944 * -955
(150) (775) (148) (633) (142) (677)
Constant 3,100 3,105 4,101 3,654 4,387 4,404
(47) (242) (50) (292) (55) (343)
R
2 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.17
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Direct Hire 0.85 * 0.95 * 0.44 * 0.65 * 0.39 * 0.32
(0.04) (0.18) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.22)
0.83 * 0.04 0.36 * -0.19 0.21 * -0.19
(0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.19)
Constant 1.61 1.64 1.68 1.66 1.60 1.67
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
R
2 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13
0.61 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.18 H0:Temp=Direct
B. Quarters Employed
N = 25,884. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work 
First contractor (33 clusters). Each column corresponds to a separate 2SLS 
regression. Instrumental variables for jobs obtained (any, direct-hire and 
temporary-help) are contractor by year of assignment dummies. All models 
include dummy variables for year by quarter of assignment and assignment-
district by year of assignment, and controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, 
other race, age and age-squared, total quarters employed and total earnings 
in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in 
temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in 
eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. Earnings values inflated to 
2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, 
** p ≤ 0.01.
Table 4
The Effect of Work First Job Placements on Subsequent Earnings and 
Quarters of Employment One to Twelve Quarters Following Work First 
Assignment: Participants Assigned 1999 - 2002




Temp Agency(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Direct Hire Job 4,173 * 3,885 * 3,107 * 1.38 * 1.07 * 0.92 *
(1,175) (1,055) (1,001) (0.34) (0.27) (0.29)
Temp Agency Job -1,190 -1,509 -1,966 * -0.09 -0.09 -0.22
(999) (966) (832) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20)
Constant 7,487 6,984 5,734 3.27 2.88 2.28
(426) (378) (347) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
R
2 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.15
Ho: Temp = Direct 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
A. Earnings
N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First 
contractor (33 clusters). Each column corresponds to a separate 2SLS regression. An 
employment spell is a set of contiguous quarters of positive earnings, and a job spell is a 
set of contiguous quarters with earnings from the same employer. Where participants 
have multiple jobs of the same length (in quarters), we break ties by using the highest 
earning spell. Instrumental variables for jobs obtained (any, direct-hire and temporary-
help) are contractor by year of assignment dummies. All models include dummy 
variables for year by quarter of assignment and assignment-district by year of 
assignment, and controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-
squared, total quarters employed and total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First 
assignment, total quarters employed in temporary help agency work and total temporary 
help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. Earnings values 
inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, 
** p ≤ 0.01.
B. Quarters Employed
Table 5
2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Work First Job Placements on Quarters Employed and 
Earnings in Longest Continuous Work Spell and Longest Continuous Spell with a Single 









JobQ 1-4 Q 5-8 Q 1-4 Q 5-8 Q 1-4 Q 5-8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Direct Hire Job 2,453* 1,720* 2,121* 1,711* 362 -28
(598) (621) (457) (625) (290) (145)
Temp Agency Job -308 -882 -1,470* -593 1,042* -226
(545) (583) (417) (652) (318) (182)
Constant 3,233 4,254 2,875 3,693 313 509
(222) (227) (158) (224) (123) (62)
R
2 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.03
H0: Temp=Direct 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.33
Direct Hire Job 0.94* 0.45* 0.97* 0.40* -0.02 -0.03
(0.19) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.05)
Temp Agency Job 0.13 -0.21 -0.38* 0.01 0.49* -0.09
(0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.06)
Constant 1.58 1.70 1.25 1.41 0.31 0.28
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
R
2 0.20 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.09
H0: Temp=Direct 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.03
N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First 
contractor (33 clusters). Each column corresponds to a separate 2SLS regression. 
Instrumental variables for jobs obtained (any, direct-hire and temporary-help) are 
contractor by year of assignment dummies. All models include dummy variables 
for year by quarter of assignment and assignment-district by year of assignment, 
and controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-squared, 
total quarters employed and total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First 
assignment, total quarters employed in temporary help agency work and total 
temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. 
Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
Table 6
Temp-Help Jobs Direct-Hire Jobs All Jobs
B. Quarters Employed
A. Earnings
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Work First Job Placements 
on Earnings and Employment by Sector over 8 Quarters: Direct-Hire and 
Temporary Help Jobs2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Direct Hire Job 4,173 * 4,336 * 4,923 * 5,123 * 4,671 * 4,671 *
(1,175) (1,053) (1,987) (1,370) (1,717) (1,444)
-1,190 -1,738 -2,120 -2,510 -2,168 -2,168
(999) (1,580) (1,299) (1,842) (1,386) (2,048)
Constant 7,487 7,477 7,294 7,255 7,392 7,392
(426) (384) (681) (489) (588) (481)
R
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25
H0:Temp=Direct 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Direct Hire 1.38 * 1.46 * 1.46 * 1.56 * 1.56 * 1.55 *
(0.34) (0.25) (0.62) (0.33) (0.51) (0.34)
-0.09 -0.29 -0.43 -0.62 -0.38 -0.38
(0.23) (0.37) (0.33) (0.44) (0.34) (0.48)
Constant 3.27 3.26 3.28 3.26 3.24 3.24
(0.12) (0.09) (0.21) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11)
R
2 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01
Table 7
Comparison of Alternative Instrumenal Variables and Estimators for the Effect 








N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First 
contractor (33 clusters). Odd-numbered columns contains two-stage least 
squares estimates. Even-numbered columns contained limited information 
maximum liklihood estimates. Instruments are: columns 1 and 2, assigned 
contractor by year; columns 3 and 4, assigned contractor; columns 5 and 6, 
fraction of individuals placed in temporary help and direct hire jobs at the 
contractor to which the participant was assigned in the same year, excluding all 
participants assigned in the same week.
All models include dummy variables for year by quarter of assignment and 
assignment-district by year of assignment, and controls for sex, white or 
Hispanic race, other race, age and age-squared, total quarters employed and 
total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters 
employed in temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency 
earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. Earnings values 
inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p 
≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
A. Earnings
Temp Agency 
IVs: Contractor × 
Year Dummies
IVs: Contractor 
DummiesOLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Hire 10,256 10,049 4.47 4.35
(288) (1197) (0.04) (0.24)
10,447 8,699 4.52 4.13
(403) (910) (0.07) (0.21)
R
2 0.28 0.27 0.60 0.60
H0: BOLS = B2SLS 0.27 0.15
H0: Direct-Hire=Temp 0.54 0.25 0.42 0.35
Direct Hire 1,071 641 0.72 0.60
(30) (161) (0.02) (0.06)
1,840 971 1.13 0.67
(84) (213) (0.03) (0.11)
R
2 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.16
H0: BOLS = B2SLS 0.00 0.00
H0: Direct-Hire=Temp 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.62
N = 37,163. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
Work First contractor (33 clusters). Each column corresponds to a 
separate OLS or 2SLS regression. Instrumental variables for jobs 
obtained (any, direct-hire and temporary-help) are contractor by year of 
assignment dummies. All models include dummy variables for year by 
quarter of assignment and assignment-district by year of assignment. 
Earnings values are inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
B. Temporary-Help Employers
Table 8
Models for the Average and Marginal Characteristics of Participants 
Obtaining Temporary Help and Direct-Hire Jobs during their Work First 
Spells
Temp Agency
Prior 8 Quarters of 
Earnings
Prior 8 Quarters of 
Employment
A. All Employers
Temp AgencyI II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII All
P-value 0.51 0.10 0.65 0.20 n/a 0.12 0.80 n/a 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.66 0.62
N 1,864 720 708 1,412 954 807 697 794 690 676 9,322
P-value 0.36 0.16 0.01 0.31 0.55 0.98 0.66 0.85 0.92 0.25 0.35
N 1,462 1,381 498 1,384 n/a 954 682 n/a 145 849 527 1,484 9,366
P-value 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.34 0.44 0.73 0.35 n/a 0.99 0.63 0.49 0.18
N 2,006 1,589 1,042 1,423 923 957 932 1,102 784 372 1,614 12,744
P-value 0.38 0.95 0.34 0.95 0.81 0.58 0.65 0.18 n/a 0.76 n/a 0.08 0.76
N 717 634 332 715 642 436 476 382 419 978 5,731
P-value 0.21 0.14 0.02 0.46 0.64 0.41 0.98 0.21 0.84 1.00 0.96 0.18 0.44
N 6,049 4,324 2,580 4,934 1,565 3,301 2,897 1,484 842 2,846 1,589 4,752 37,163
2002 - 2003
All Years
Each cell provides the p-value from a Seemingly Unrelated Regression for the null hypothesis that the 10 main 
sample covariates are balanced across clients assigned to Work First contractors within the relevant assignment 
district and year cell. Covariates tested are sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-squared, total 
quarters employed and total earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in 
temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First 
assignment. Right-hand column and bottom row provide analogous test statistics pooling across districts either within 
a year or across years within a district. Bottom right-hand cell provides the test statistic for all districts and years 
simultaneously. Cells marked "n/a" indicate that there was only one contractor operating in the district during most or 
all of the indicated year.
Appendix Table 1
P-Values of Tests of Random Assignment of Participant Demographic Characteristics across Work First Contractors 




2001 - 2002OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Hire Job 4,705 * 5,388 * 1.32 * 1.59 *
(176) (1,258) (0.05) (0.38)
3,759 * -2,334 * 1.23 * -0.66 *
(272) (977) (0.07) (0.25)
Constant 7,693 7,995 3.32 3.39
(84) (486) (0.03) (0.13)
R
2 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.19
H0:Temp=Direct 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00
N = 24,903. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
on Work First contractor (33 clusters). Each column 
corresponds to a separate OLS or 2SLS regression. 
Instrumental variables for jobs obtained (any, direct-hire and 
temporary-help) are contractor by year of assignment dummies. 
All models include dummy variables for year by quarter of 
assignment and assignment-district by year of assignment, and 
controls for sex, white or Hispanic race, other race, age and age-
squared, total quarters employed and total earnings in eight 
quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed 
in temporary help agency work and total temporary help agency 
earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. 
Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
B. Quarters 
Appendix Table 2
The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Wage and Salary 
Earnings in Eight Quarters Following Work First Assignment: 
Sample Limited to First Work-First Spell for Each Participant
A. Earnings
Temp Agency Job(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Direct Hire Job 4,173 * 4,003 * 1.38 * 1.37*
(1,175) (1,144) (0.34) (0.34)
-1,190 172 -0.09 0.37
(999) (1,319) (0.23) (0.35)
H0:Direct(1) = Direct(3) 0.34 0.73
H0:Temp(2) = Temp(3) 0.09 0.07
0.22 0.20
N = 37,163 x 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First 
contractor (33 clusters). Each panel tabulates a separate 2SLS model in which three 
full copies of the data set are stacked to estimate an equation for eight quarter 
earnings or employment that nests the following three specifications: temporary-help 
and direct-hire employment as endogenous variables; direct-hire employment as an 
endogenous variable (temporary-help dummy excluded); and temporary-help 
employment as an endogenous variable (direct-hire employment dummy excluded). 
The bottom rows of each panel provide p-values for hypothesis tests of equality of 
coefficients for instrumented variables.
All models include dummy variables for year by quarter of assignment and 
assignment-district by year of assignment, and controls for sex, white or Hispanic 
race, other race, age and age-squared, total quarters employed and total earnings in 
eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in temporary 
help agency work and total temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to 
Work First assignment. Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI-U). ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
Temporary Agency Job
H0: Direct(1) = Direct(3) 
and Temp(2) = Temp(3)
Appendix Table 3
Comparing Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Efffect of Direct Hire and 
Temporary Help Placements on Earnings and Employment over Eight Quarters while 
Including Endogenous Variables Individually and Simultaneously
A. Earnings B. Employment